Let me address why I do not hold free will. I'll try not to use any double speak or contradictions It might be hard because I've heard that's all Calvinists can do according to the above posts.
No one denies that man has a will—that is, a faculty of choosing what he wishes to say, do, and think. But have you ever reflected on the pitiful weakness of your will? Though you have the ability to make a decision, you do not have the power to carry out your purpose. Will may devise a course of action, but will has no power to execute its intention.
Joseph's brothers hated him. They sold him to be a slave. But God used their actions to make him a ruler over themselves. They chose their course of action to harm Joseph. But God in his power directed events for Joseph's good. He said, "You meant evil against me; but God meant it for good" Genesis 50:20
There will was to get rid of Joseph and when they received the silver from the slave trader they thought the desires of the will were successful. They were in for a rude awakening when that famine hit.
And how many of your decisions are miserably thwarted? You may choose to be a millionaire, but God's providence is likely to prevent it. You may decide to be a scholar, but bad health, an unstable home, or lack of finances may frustrate your will. You choose to go on a vacation, but an automobile accident may send you to the hospital instead.
By saying that your will is free, we certainly do not mean that it determines the course of your life. You did not choose the sickness, sorrow, war, and poverty that have spoiled your happiness. You did not choose to have enemies. If man's will is so potent, why not choose to live on and on? But you must die. The major factors which shape your life cannot thank your will. You did not select your social status, color, intelligence, and so on.
"A man's mind plans his way, but the Lord directs his steps" Prov. 16:9.
Rather than extolling the human will, we ought to humbly praise the Lord whose purposes shape our lives. As Jeremiah confessed, "I know, 0 Lord, that the way of man is not in himself: it is not in man to direct his steps." Jer. 10:23
You do realize no one really holds to an absolute free will. It is soft -limited by ones nature
The Five Tenets of Soft Libertarianism
Ultimate responsibility (UR) Ultimate responsibility indicates the ultimate origin of decisions.
Agent causation (AC) A person is the source and origin of his choices.
The principle of alternative possibilities (AP) At crucial times, the ability to choose or refrain from choosing is genuinely available.
The reality of will-setting moments A person does not always have the ability to choose to the contrary. Certain free choices result in the loss of freedom.
The distinction between freedom of responsibility and freedom of integrity The Bible presents freedom as a permission (the freedom of responsibility) and as a power (the freedom of integrity).
From the works of libertarian philosophers such as Hugh McCann, Timothy O’Connor, and particularly Robert Kane, five central tenets of soft libertarianism can be gleaned. Thus equipped, soft libertarianism provides a more complete picture of human choice than soft determinism, and thus a more accurate one. Soft libertarianism, or concurrence, holds that a moral agent has the power to choose in a libertarian sense, but the limits of this ability are decided by his character. While a determinist argues a person’s choice is determined by his character, soft libertarianism contends a person’s character simply determines what sets of choices are available. Outside influences and internal dispositions are factors, but the agent has the ability to take any one of the choices within the set. Possessing libertarian freedom means we genuinely choose, but we dwell in a fallen world so it is not an easy, even, unslanted choice. And we are finite creatures, so the range of choices is limited.
The first tenet of soft libertarianism is ultimate responsibility (UR). Question: how does a person know the ultimate source of his sins or the ultimate source of his salvation? Answer: whoever is ultimately responsible. And the Bible makes clear that we are responsible for our sins and God is responsible for our salvation. We receive all the blame and He receives all the credit. As Kane states, “The basic idea is that the ultimate responsibility lies where the ultimate cause is.” Ultimate “buck-stopping” responsibility indicates ultimate origin.
Kane argues that libertarians make a mistake by focusing too quickly on the criteria of alternative possibilities (AP), i.e., the ability to do otherwise, and contends rather that we should begin with the notion of ultimate responsibility. UR focuses on the grounds or the sources of a person’s actions or choices. UR, rather than AP, should be the initial feature of soft libertarianism. And unless one wants to posit an infinite regress of past causes or (for the theist) he wants the chain of responsibility to go back to God, then he has to understand that moral agents are responsible in an ultimate sense. Kane concludes, “Therein, I believe, lies the core of the traditional ‘problem of free will.’ ”
Significantly, the UR condition does not require that every act be done of our own free will (thus, to an extent “partially vindicating” the compatibilist position). However, it is only a partial vindication, because UR argues that we “could have done otherwise” with respect to some past choices that formed our present character.
UR implies the second tenet: agent causation (AC). If a human being is found guilty when he stands before God, it is because he is the origin of his sins. His sins belong to him—he owns them. This is why everyone outside of Christ is damned. Though we inherited Adam’s corruption and are judged federally in him, in a real way each person is the source and origin of his own rebellion.
When the question is asked, “Why did Adam sin?” the soft libertarian answer is, “Because he chose to sin.” No other or further answer is needed. God placed him in an environment where sin was possible, but God is not the cause of Adam’s sin. In fact, God is not culpable in any way. Satan is certainly guilty of enticing the original couple, but in the final analysis the blame for the actual sin they committed does not fall on him. No, Scripture consistently testifies that “by one man sin entered into the world” (Rom 5:12 KJV).
AC stands in contrast to event causation. Rather than functioning simply as a link in a chain of events, a causal agent operates as the impetus for new causal chains. This creative ability reflects the imago dei. As Robert Saucy states, “The human being is like God in that he has the ability to create thoughts and actions that have no determinative cause outside of the self.” In other words, humans are causal agents with the capacity to originate choices. Saucy goes on to say that this ability constitutes what might be termed “a little citadel of creativity ex nihilo.”
After establishing the tenets of UR and AC, then and only then are we ready to consider the third tenet: the principle of alternative possibilities (AP). A necessary component for liability is that, at a significant point in the chain of events, the ability to choose or refrain from choosing had to genuinely be available.
Compatibilists work from the intuition that if a choice is undetermined then it must be capricious. Indeterminism is equated with inexplicable choices in which an agent’s will is disconnected from the rest of his person, resulting in random and chaotic choices that bewilder even the agent. In this scenario, free will resembles something akin to Tourette syndrome or epilepsy rather than a moral ability. But as determinists admit, in this field intuitions must be questioned.
Kane responds by arguing, “It is a mistake to assume that undetermined means ‘uncaused.’ ” Rather, one must think of the effort to choose and indeterminism as “fused,” not that indeterminism is something that occurs before or after the choice. The fact that the choice is indeterminate doesn’t make it any less the agent’s choice, nor does it make the choice simply a matter of chance or luck. So the objection that undetermined choices are “happenings” is question-begging. It assumes what the objector wishes to prove: that all choices are determined. However, concurrence does not require AP to always be present, which leads to the next point.
The fourth tenet of soft libertarianism is the recognition of will-setting moments. This point sets soft libertarianism apart from libertarianism as generally understood. I argue, like Kane, that libertarian freedom does not entail that a person must always have the ability to choose to the contrary. Certain free choices result in the loss of freedom. An obvious example is someone jumping off a cliff. Halfway down he might change his mind, but he does not possess the ability to choose otherwise. AP does not always have to be present, but only during those times when the choices we make form us into who we are. Only then do we need to be free in a libertarian sense. The “will-setting” or “self-forming” actions occur at those crucial, difficult, or critical junctures.
Consider how we are torn during times of moral indecision. However, whether it is Luther submitting to the authority of Scripture or Pharaoh hardening his heart, those soul-searching moments are also times of self-formation. During these times the outcome is uncertain because our wills are divided by conflicting desires. Yet the decision made at that time affects who we are as persons, so that later similar decisions do not produce a similar conflict. How we choose changes us so that, for better or worse, that choice no longer affects us in the same way. This is the fundamental principle underlying the practice of utilizing the spiritual disciplines for character formation. The reality of will-setting moments implies the next tenet.
The fifth tenet of soft libertarianism is the distinction between the two types of ability: freedom of responsibility and freedom of integrity. As stated earlier, freedom can be understood in two ways: as a permission and as an ability. The Bible often presents freedom as a permission, a privilege, or a right to choose. An example of freedom of permission is when Paul instructs that a Christian widow is “free to be married to anyone she wants,” as long as she marries a believer (1 Cor 7:39). This is what we would generally call “liberty,” and the Bible provides many examples of this type of freedom (2 Cor 9:7; Phlm 14).
Freedom of permission presupposes that a person has the second type of freedom, i.e., the ability to make a reasonable choice. This is why the Bible also presents freedom as a power or ability to make a choice. As an ability, the Bible teaches that there are types of ability: freedom of responsibility and freedom of integrity. Freedom of responsibility is the ability to be the originator of a decision, choice, or action. Because a human being is the agent or cause of an action, he is responsible for the moral nature of that action and its consequences. When a situation arises that requires a decision, by definition the freedom of responsibility is the ability to respond. Take for example, if a man hears someone in the lake calling for help. Someone who cannot swim has a different level of responsibility from the one who simply chooses not to respond.
This brings up the notion of freedom of integrity, an important concept to soft libertarianism. Freedom of integrity is the ability to act in a way that is consistent with what a person knows to be the right thing to do. This category consists of the freedom to be the kind of person one wants to be. It is the ability to translate one’s values into action. It speaks of the level of development one must reach to be a fully functioning and mature person. This is a crucial component to our understanding of freedom. More than anything else, the Bible presents freedom to be the ability to do that which is right.
This concept of freedom pays more attention to the concept of “person” than to free will because ascriptions of personal integrity depend on an analysis of personal identity. The doctrine of the “age of accountability” is based on the notion of freedom of integrity. It is the belief that a child must reach a certain point of mental, emotional, and spiritual development before he is accountable.
The notion of the freedom of integrity speaks to the conflict one often has between his values and his desires (see Romans 7). Unless one is completely pathological, sin and failure to live according to his values will result in the loss of peace of mind that comes from living with integrity.
It is easy to understand the freedom of integrity on a trivial level: freedom of integrity enables one to exercise as he should, or to not procrastinate about an assignment. The principle of freedom of integrity indicates that self-discipline is actually a profound type of freedom. As such, the relationship between free will and freedom of personal integrity can be confusing. It is commonplace to be morally responsible but lack freedom of personal integrity. Free will addresses the minimal conditions for responsibility, while freedom of personal integrity goes beyond that.
Here is the truly dangerous thing: a person can have enough freedom to be responsible yet lack (or lose) the freedom of integrity. The Bible says all have the freedom of moral responsibility but not all have the freedom of integrity.
For example, in Rom 7:13–25, Paul describes the condition of being morally responsible but lacking in moral integrity. Other clear examples are the addicted and the pathological. Heroin addicts, compulsive gamblers, and pedophiles may have lost the integrity to say no to these vices, but they are still responsible for their actions. As drug addicts illustrate, it is possible to lose this type of freedom. This loss does not exempt the person from accountability for his actions. Loss of this ability means that a person can still be morally responsible even though he is no longer capable of choosing otherwise. In fact, in the very important area of the ability to respond to God, this is the exact condition of every lost person outside the grace of God.
The progressive sanctification of a believer and his growth in grace can be understood in terms of freedom of integrity. In many ways, the process of being conformed to the image of Christ is an incremental restoration of the freedom of integrity. Sanctification is the restoring of a Christian’s ability to bring his life into conformity with the will of God. This is true freedom—the ability to live a life that is pleasing to God. Christ promises the freedom of integrity (John 8:36), which is the ability to obey the will of God.
The incremental nature of progressive sanctification should be a hint to us about the incremental nature of the freedom of integrity. That is, freedom of integrity is not something which operates like a light switch—all or nothing; on or off. Rather, it seems to be something gained or lost in increments. There appear to be gradations of the freedom of integrity.
Keathley, Kenneth. Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach (pp. 73-79). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.