The Elect

[civic]

"You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good." There you have an example of men acting freely according to their inclination, and at the same time God ordaining that it must be so.

Nowhere did it say God ordained that to happen. That is your presupposition.

I could just as easily say it was Gods foreknowledge since neither ordain, predestine or foreknowledge are not in the text. Its called in theology- eisegesis.

hope this helps !!!

 

[Dizerner]

"You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good." There you have an example of men acting freely according to their inclination, and at the same time God ordaining that it must be so.

I hope you could understand that doesn't seem to logically contradict LFW.

The very words "allow" and "permit" already assume the presence of a competing exterior will, or the words are meaninglessly flattened out to "decree" and "decide."

 

[The Rogue Tomato]

I hope you could understand that doesn't seem to logically contradict LFW.

The very words "allow" and "permit" already assume the presence of a competing exterior will, or the words are meaninglessly flattened out to "decree" and "decide."

The word isn't "allow" or "permit". It's "meant".

 

[Dizerner]

The word isn't "allow" or "permit". It's "meant".

You're an expert at missing my point it seems.

It's the same general idea, as it specifically has two parties "meaning" something.

Your assertion that therefore it "must be so" does not logically follow.

 

[The Rogue Tomato]

You're an expert at missing my point it seems.

It's the same general idea, as it specifically has two parties "meaning" something.

Your assertion that therefore it "must be so" does not logically follow.

The words "allowed" "permitted" are passive. It happened and I won't interfere. "Meant" is active. It's happening because I will it to be so.

 

[Dizerner]

The words "allowed" "permitted" are passive. It happened and I won't interfere. "Meant" is active. It's happening because I will it to be so.

If God's unilateral decree decided what Joseph's brothers would "mean," I would expect the text to tell us:

"God meant you to be evil so that God meant it for good."

This logically reduces to a tautology, and makes evil a form of good.

By creating an opposing will to God's will, "you meant it for evil," we thereby logically know God's will does not coincide with all other wills.

 

[The Rogue Tomato]

If God's unilateral decree decided what Joseph's brothers would "mean," I would expect the text to tell us:

"God meant you to be evil so that God meant it for good."

This logically reduces to a tautology, and makes evil a form of good.

By creating an opposing will to God's will, "you meant it for evil," we thereby logically know God's will does not coincide with all other wills.

The text is very simple. "You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good." You're having trouble dealing with it because you're applying your limited human logic to what it says so simply.

8 “For My thoughts are not your thoughts,
Nor are your ways My ways,” says the Lord.
9 “For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
So are My ways higher than your ways,
And My thoughts than your thoughts.

That's why I take it for what it says in black and white.

 

[Bob Carabbio]

What's the big deal about me giving an answer? Paul states things very clearly. God has determined who he will have mercy on and who he won't.

Obviously you're NOT ABLE TO GIVE AN ANSWER, or you would have.

 

[Dizerner]

That's why I take it for what it says in black and white.

You absolutely do NOT take it for "what it says."

It SAYS they meant it for evil, not that God decreed them to mean it for evil.

So you apply the human PHILOSOPHY of DIVINE DETERMINISM over the plain and clear declaration of free human choices.

 

[The Rogue Tomato]

You absolutely do NOT take it for "what it says."

It SAYS they meant it for evil, not that God decreed them to mean it for evil.

So you apply the human PHILOSOPHY of DIVINE DETERMINISM over the plain and clear declaration of free human choices.

Reading comprehension: "You MEANT it for evil, but God MEANT it for good." Meant what? Meant that Joseph's brothers would do evil. Why? Because God would use that for good.

You struggle with that because you think God ordaining that Joseph's brothers to do an evil act would mean that God controlled them like robots. But it's not robots vs. libertarian free will. That's a false dichotomy. Joseph's brothers did it of their own free will, but God ordained it to be so. It could not have gone otherwise.

 

[civic]

Reading comprehension: "You MEANT it for evil, but God MEANT it for good." Meant what? Meant that Joseph's brothers would do evil. Why? Because God would use that for good.

You struggle with that because you think God ordaining that Joseph's brothers to do an evil act would mean that God controlled them like robots. But it's not robots vs. libertarian free will. That's a false dichotomy. Joseph's brothers did it of their own free will, but God ordained it to be so. It could not have gone otherwise.

If it was preordained, predestined then they had no choice to do otherwise. So they were nothing but pawns on a chessboard controlled by the chess master

 

[Dizerner]

Reading comprehension

You read exhaustive divine determinism into all Bible texts as a presupposition.

Then you claim you derive it "from" the text.

That's spiritual blindness.

 

[The Rogue Tomato]

If it was preordained, predestined then they had no choice to do otherwise. So they were nothing but pawns on a chessboard controlled by the chess master

I'm sorry you can't reconcile man's willing actions with God's ordination of those actions. It's not something someone in the flesh can accept. I know you would be more comfortable if Joseph had said, "You meant it for evil, but God allowed it for good", but that's not what the text says.

 

[makesends]

"You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good." There you have an example of men acting freely according to their inclination, and at the same time God ordaining that it must be so.

Exactly right! God INTENDED that it happen, and that, for good reason.

 

[makesends]

You read exhaustive divine determinism into all Bible texts as a presupposition.

Then you claim you derive it "from" the text.

That's spiritual blindness.

Can you say you don't read some presupposition or other, some bias, some worldview, into your Bible texts? We all do.

 

[Dizerner]

Can you say you don't read some presupposition or other, some bias, some worldview, into your Bible texts? We all do.

If we ALL do, why does almost every Calvinist I've talked to deny they do it?

Can you explain that?

 

[The Rogue Tomato]

If we ALL do, why does almost every Calvinist I've talked to deny they do it?

Can you explain that?

Can you explain how "God meant it for good" somehow really means "God allowed it for good"?

 

[Dizerner]

Can you explain how "God meant it for good" somehow really means "God allowed it for good"?

Yes, I can.

In fact I already have, but I am a patient man.

The word "allow" has a definition of more than one will.

That part is important, and I need you to follow my logic—you have a predisposition not to see the logic here, so you need to follow this closely. The word "allow" has, by definition, the presence of more than one will. That part is very, very important.

Now, we have to ask ourselves, how many wills are in this passage? How many wills are described and illustrated by these words?

Now if someone "means" something, we speak of "intent." This "intent" is a desire, a purpose, a direction of the agent—that is, someone is "meaning" to do or accomplish something, they have a plan. For an agent to have a plan this requires a will, a decision maker, to pick among options and settle on one thing to "mean."

Rocks don't "mean" something. A tree doesn't "mean" to wreck your house, it just falls on it. Meteors don't "mean" to flash in the sky, they just do by rote physics with no intention. So to "mean" something logically necessitates a will.

Now how does "allow" interface with "mean"? Let's say, we are playing poker, and I go all in with a bad hand. Then you call me. Now I say, "I allowed that to happen—I wanted you to win." Perhaps, because you are a keen player, you "meant" to win by skill. And I "meant" to let you win. Now we have two wills "meaning" two different things.

Now suppose, you were a mean person, and you really wanted to rob me of all my money. But I am a kind person, and I wanted to let you have it, because you need to pay your rent and buy groceries, and you are a little down on your luck. Then I say, "You know what—you meant that for evil, but I meant it for good." There is two wills there, and two people meaning two different things.

Now suppose I uniterally decided to decree what happened to you, and decide your choice for you. That requires removing your "mean to," it requires removing your determination as an agency, and replacing it with mine. So now, whatever you do, is only and solely what I decide for it to be—there is only one "mean to," and that "mean to" is mine. I force you to call by hypnotizing you, for your own good.

Which of these descriptions is in the passage?

One "will" or two?

One "mean to" or two "mean tos"?

One "purpose" or two "purposes"?

And thus we see that the text is actually an excellent proof of libertarian free will, and completely disproves monergism.

 

[makesends]

If we ALL do, why does almost every Calvinist I've talked to deny they do it?

Can you explain that?

Almost every Calvinist I've talked to doesn't deny it.

Can you explain that?

Nevertheless, the question is irrelevant. They all do it, like everyone else. The question is not whether we read something into the text, but whether we recognize the fact that we do, and just do our best to get it as close to right as we can. To me, Calvinism/Reformed Theology, which is pretty close to what I believe, matches up with scripture and makes logical sense. Maybe you are mistaking their confidence with denial of bias.

 

[makesends]

Yes, I can.

In fact I already have, but I am a patient man.

The word "allow" has a definition of more than one will.

That part is important, and I need you to follow my logic—you have a predisposition not to see the logic here, so you need to follow this closely. The word "allow" has, by definition, the presence of more than one will. That part is very, very important.

Now, we have to ask ourselves, how many wills are in this passage? How many wills are described and illustrated by these words?

Now if someone "means" something, we speak of "intent." This "intent" is a desire, a purpose, a direction of the agent—that is, someone is "meaning" to do or accomplish something, they have a plan. For an agent to have a plan this requires a will, a decision maker, to pick among options and settle on one thing to "mean."

Rocks don't "mean" something. A tree doesn't "mean" to wreck your house, it just falls on it. Meteors don't "mean" to flash in the sky, they just do by rote physics with no intention. So to "mean" something logically necessitates a will.

Now how does "allow" interface with "mean"? Let's say, we are playing poker, and I go all in with a bad hand. Then you call me. Now I say, "I allowed that to happen—I wanted you to win." Perhaps, because you are a keen player, you "meant" to win by skill. And I "meant" to let you win. Now we have two wills "meaning" two different things.

Now suppose, you were a mean person, and you really wanted to rob me of all my money. But I am a kind person, and I wanted to let you have it, because you need to pay your rent and buy groceries, and you are a little down on your luck. Then I say, "You know what—you meant that for evil, but I meant it for good." There is two wills there, and two people meaning two different things.

Now suppose I uniterally decided to decree what happened to you, and decide your choice for you. That requires removing your "mean to," it requires removing your determination as an agency, and replacing it with mine. So now, whatever you do, is only and solely what I decide for it to be—there is only one "mean to," and that "mean to" is mine. I force you to call by hypnotizing you, for your own good.

Which of these descriptions is in the passage?

One "will" or two?

One "mean to" or two "mean tos"?

One "purpose" or two "purposes"?

And thus we see that the text is actually an excellent proof of libertarian free will, and completely disproves monergism.

You say, "Now suppose I uniterally decided to decree what happened to you, and decide your choice for you. That requires removing your "mean to," it requires removing your determination as an agency, and replacing it with mine"

That is presumption. In the same way as the command does not imply the ability to obey, neither does God choosing what we will do deny that we also choose it. God doesn't decide our choice FOR us. He decides it concerning us. We also decide it. As a matter of fact, you would be hard pressed to show how it would be possible for us to decide anything at all if he did not establish it.