Theophilus
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I found this information on this topic thought I would share it.
The Problem with Divine Determinism
The view of divine sovereignty held by Calvinists is known as divine determinism. It is called such because it is God who determines everything that happens. There are other forms of determinism, for example naturalistic determinism (sometimes known as mechanistic determinism). In this view “matter or nature is all that exists, and it is completely controlled by natural laws. . . . These [laws of nature] are the sole causative agents in the universe.” In principle, if one knew the position and velocity of every particle in the universe at any given moment then, knowing all the governing laws of nature, one could calculate the exact state of the universe at any time in the future.491 Psychological determinism seeks to explain all human behavior by appeal to antecedent causes that cause the person to act the way he or she does. Such antecedent causes may be hereditary, genetic, social, or environmental. Perhaps the most famous proponent of this form of determinism is the psychologist and social philosopher B. F. Skinner (1904–1990). The term behaviorism is often associated with his name. He boldly asserted that “the autonomous agent to which behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environment.”
Many people, and Christians especially, have looked rather unfavorably to such forms of determinism as an explanation for human actions and choices. The primary reason is not hard to discern: the sense of moral accountability for one’s actions is undermined. The Calvinist Albert Mohler captures the sentiment well when he says:
This link between moral choice and moral responsibility is virtually instinctive to humans. As a matter of fact, it is basic to our understanding of what it means to be human. We hold each other responsible for actions and choices. But if all of our choices are illusory—and everything is merely the “inevitable consequence” of something beyond our control, moral responsibility is an exercise in delusion.
Such notions of determinism smack too close to fatalism to be comfortable. It is encapsulated by the saying “whatever will be, will be.” If all one’s actions and behaviors are determined by one’s environment or “something beyond our control” then indeed any sense of moral responsibility would seem to be nothing but wishful thinking. The thief could claim that he was not responsible since he was brought up under very hard circumstances and learned to steal to survive; the rapist could blame his hormones for his behavior; the bully could absolve himself of responsibility by claiming he learned his behavior from a delinquent father, and so on.
Now, the point in bringing up determinism generally, is that it helps to highlight the problem with divine or theistic determinism, for all the problems associated with naturalistic or psychological determinism, especially the issue of moral accountability, apply equally to divine determinism. Cottrell explains the problem well:
[Theistic determinism is the view] that the eternal Sovereign absolutely and directly ordains or causes everything that happens, including the thoughts and actions of human beings. This means that God is the primary causative agent of everything that happens in the universe. . . . As with any determinism, this calls into question the reality of human free will along with its corollary, moral responsibility.
An all-determining God, in the final analysis, “could never have any more glory from men than he could receive from the operations of the laws of nature.” Furthermore, “Although such a view of man accords well with much psychological and sociological presupposition in modern secular research, we feel compelled to set it aside as a final principle because it leads necessarily to manipulation, to irresponsibility, and to God as the ultimate author of sin.” In a realm where everything that happens flows inexorably from an antecedent cause, in this case God, then the reality of human responsibility for actions taken by a person is effectively undermined and removed. This is necessarily so because the human agent in the final analysis could do no other than he in fact does. In fact, to praise someone for doing what he was determined by God to do, or to blame someone for doing what they could not avoid doing becomes not only unjustified but ultimately meaningless.
Furthermore, if divine determinism were true, then God’s character as a loving and gracious being is seriously called into question. The reason for this is clear: if everything that happens flows from the divine will expressed in a comprehensive decree that governs the world, then this would of necessity include all the evils and sins in the world. While no Calvinist would accept this conclusion, it seems to me to be inescapable. The Arminian scholar Roger Olsen summarizes the issue well: “Generally speaking, with few exceptions, Calvinists affirm God’s perfect goodness and love, but their belief in meticulous providence and absolute, all-determining sovereignty (determinism) undermines what they say.” Olsen goes on to say, “The Calvinist account of God’s sovereignty . . . inevitably makes God the author of sin, evil, and innocent suffering . . . and thereby impugns the integrity of God’s character as good and loving.”
Another fundamental problem with any form of determinism, including divine determinism, where everything that happens is the consequence of an antecedent cause, whether natural, psychological, or divine, is that one is left with a massive “is.” Perhaps this principle is best explained by way of illustration. Suppose John lied, then I could attribute his lying to God’s determining that he lie. Now suppose, under the identical circumstances, John does not lie then I could attribute his non-lying to God’s determining he not lie. Suppose John only told a half-truth, then I would have to attribute that half-truth to God’s determining that John only tell a half-truth. Suppose John kept silent, that too would be attributed to God’s all-determining powers. In fact, if John did not lie, but I thought that he did lie, then my viewpoint itself would likewise be determined by God. Whatever John did would have to be attributed to God’s determining actions upon John, and whatever my own assessment of John’s actions would also be determined by God. Under such circumstances, there is no way to judge an action right or wrong—it just is. To be able to judge an action one would need an independent, non-determined, stance from which a judgment could be made. But this is precisely what is lacking in a comprehensively determined environment.
Not only would ethical evaluations, as in the above illustration, be impossible, but so also would judgments of any kind: truth or falsity, justice or injustice, arguments valid or invalid, correct or incorrect, beauty or ugliness, right or wrong, even logical and illogical—all are rendered ultimately meaningless in an all-determining environment. Furthermore, in an all-divinely-determined environment there is no such thing as “ought.” “For ‘ought’ means ‘could have and should have done otherwise.’ But this is impossible according to determinism.” There is simply no independent framework from which to evaluate the validity of a moral claim or action. This is true for any kind of determinism, including divine determinism. Hart expresses the problem thus: “To assert that every finite contingency is solely and unambiguously the effect of a single will working all things . . . is to assert nothing but that the world is what it is, for any meaningful distinction between the will of God and the simple totality of cosmic eventuality has collapsed.” Philosophers capture the idea in this succinct expression: “no ought from is.” In other words, one cannot say what “ought” to be the case, when all one has is an all-determining “is.”
While, as we have seen, God’s sovereignty understood as divine determinism would allow for the idea of an unconditional election of individuals to salvation, the cost is exceedingly high; a world that is ultimately meaningless and irrational, populated by people who cannot be held morally responsible for their actions, and governed by a God who decrees not only goods but also every imaginable horror, evil, and sin.
Geoffrey D. Robinson, Saved by Grace through Faith or Saved by Decree? A Biblical and Theological Critique of Calvinist Soteriology
The Problem with Divine Determinism
The view of divine sovereignty held by Calvinists is known as divine determinism. It is called such because it is God who determines everything that happens. There are other forms of determinism, for example naturalistic determinism (sometimes known as mechanistic determinism). In this view “matter or nature is all that exists, and it is completely controlled by natural laws. . . . These [laws of nature] are the sole causative agents in the universe.” In principle, if one knew the position and velocity of every particle in the universe at any given moment then, knowing all the governing laws of nature, one could calculate the exact state of the universe at any time in the future.491 Psychological determinism seeks to explain all human behavior by appeal to antecedent causes that cause the person to act the way he or she does. Such antecedent causes may be hereditary, genetic, social, or environmental. Perhaps the most famous proponent of this form of determinism is the psychologist and social philosopher B. F. Skinner (1904–1990). The term behaviorism is often associated with his name. He boldly asserted that “the autonomous agent to which behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environment.”
Many people, and Christians especially, have looked rather unfavorably to such forms of determinism as an explanation for human actions and choices. The primary reason is not hard to discern: the sense of moral accountability for one’s actions is undermined. The Calvinist Albert Mohler captures the sentiment well when he says:
This link between moral choice and moral responsibility is virtually instinctive to humans. As a matter of fact, it is basic to our understanding of what it means to be human. We hold each other responsible for actions and choices. But if all of our choices are illusory—and everything is merely the “inevitable consequence” of something beyond our control, moral responsibility is an exercise in delusion.
Such notions of determinism smack too close to fatalism to be comfortable. It is encapsulated by the saying “whatever will be, will be.” If all one’s actions and behaviors are determined by one’s environment or “something beyond our control” then indeed any sense of moral responsibility would seem to be nothing but wishful thinking. The thief could claim that he was not responsible since he was brought up under very hard circumstances and learned to steal to survive; the rapist could blame his hormones for his behavior; the bully could absolve himself of responsibility by claiming he learned his behavior from a delinquent father, and so on.
Now, the point in bringing up determinism generally, is that it helps to highlight the problem with divine or theistic determinism, for all the problems associated with naturalistic or psychological determinism, especially the issue of moral accountability, apply equally to divine determinism. Cottrell explains the problem well:
[Theistic determinism is the view] that the eternal Sovereign absolutely and directly ordains or causes everything that happens, including the thoughts and actions of human beings. This means that God is the primary causative agent of everything that happens in the universe. . . . As with any determinism, this calls into question the reality of human free will along with its corollary, moral responsibility.
An all-determining God, in the final analysis, “could never have any more glory from men than he could receive from the operations of the laws of nature.” Furthermore, “Although such a view of man accords well with much psychological and sociological presupposition in modern secular research, we feel compelled to set it aside as a final principle because it leads necessarily to manipulation, to irresponsibility, and to God as the ultimate author of sin.” In a realm where everything that happens flows inexorably from an antecedent cause, in this case God, then the reality of human responsibility for actions taken by a person is effectively undermined and removed. This is necessarily so because the human agent in the final analysis could do no other than he in fact does. In fact, to praise someone for doing what he was determined by God to do, or to blame someone for doing what they could not avoid doing becomes not only unjustified but ultimately meaningless.
Furthermore, if divine determinism were true, then God’s character as a loving and gracious being is seriously called into question. The reason for this is clear: if everything that happens flows from the divine will expressed in a comprehensive decree that governs the world, then this would of necessity include all the evils and sins in the world. While no Calvinist would accept this conclusion, it seems to me to be inescapable. The Arminian scholar Roger Olsen summarizes the issue well: “Generally speaking, with few exceptions, Calvinists affirm God’s perfect goodness and love, but their belief in meticulous providence and absolute, all-determining sovereignty (determinism) undermines what they say.” Olsen goes on to say, “The Calvinist account of God’s sovereignty . . . inevitably makes God the author of sin, evil, and innocent suffering . . . and thereby impugns the integrity of God’s character as good and loving.”
Another fundamental problem with any form of determinism, including divine determinism, where everything that happens is the consequence of an antecedent cause, whether natural, psychological, or divine, is that one is left with a massive “is.” Perhaps this principle is best explained by way of illustration. Suppose John lied, then I could attribute his lying to God’s determining that he lie. Now suppose, under the identical circumstances, John does not lie then I could attribute his non-lying to God’s determining he not lie. Suppose John only told a half-truth, then I would have to attribute that half-truth to God’s determining that John only tell a half-truth. Suppose John kept silent, that too would be attributed to God’s all-determining powers. In fact, if John did not lie, but I thought that he did lie, then my viewpoint itself would likewise be determined by God. Whatever John did would have to be attributed to God’s determining actions upon John, and whatever my own assessment of John’s actions would also be determined by God. Under such circumstances, there is no way to judge an action right or wrong—it just is. To be able to judge an action one would need an independent, non-determined, stance from which a judgment could be made. But this is precisely what is lacking in a comprehensively determined environment.
Not only would ethical evaluations, as in the above illustration, be impossible, but so also would judgments of any kind: truth or falsity, justice or injustice, arguments valid or invalid, correct or incorrect, beauty or ugliness, right or wrong, even logical and illogical—all are rendered ultimately meaningless in an all-determining environment. Furthermore, in an all-divinely-determined environment there is no such thing as “ought.” “For ‘ought’ means ‘could have and should have done otherwise.’ But this is impossible according to determinism.” There is simply no independent framework from which to evaluate the validity of a moral claim or action. This is true for any kind of determinism, including divine determinism. Hart expresses the problem thus: “To assert that every finite contingency is solely and unambiguously the effect of a single will working all things . . . is to assert nothing but that the world is what it is, for any meaningful distinction between the will of God and the simple totality of cosmic eventuality has collapsed.” Philosophers capture the idea in this succinct expression: “no ought from is.” In other words, one cannot say what “ought” to be the case, when all one has is an all-determining “is.”
While, as we have seen, God’s sovereignty understood as divine determinism would allow for the idea of an unconditional election of individuals to salvation, the cost is exceedingly high; a world that is ultimately meaningless and irrational, populated by people who cannot be held morally responsible for their actions, and governed by a God who decrees not only goods but also every imaginable horror, evil, and sin.
Geoffrey D. Robinson, Saved by Grace through Faith or Saved by Decree? A Biblical and Theological Critique of Calvinist Soteriology
